Amphi Jaurès, 29 rue d'Ulm, École Normale Supérieure
This event aims to take a step back and reflect on everyday mathematical modeling. We aim to organize a discussion on the diversity of this practice in biology and the homologies in current models. We wish to center those discussions around two related problems. First, given that the general reference system of biology builds on a notion of novelty to classify living beings, how can we use mathematical structures (using predefined spaces of possibilities) to describe living beings while avoiding contradiction? Is it reasonable that many of these practices do not even consider the organization of the organisms? Second, if models can be considered as instruments that contribute to shaping scientific reasoning, is their inscription within broader theoretical frameworks (not) necessary? Are data-based approaches sufficient to understand the living, or should theoretical and methodological jumps be performed? Is the perspective of the National Research Council sound when it states that not all New Biologists are now, or will in the future be, biologists? How to take mathematics and modelling seriously and, at the same time, avoid the disruption of biological knowledge by the fetishization of those tools?
Biologists often use the term "disruption" informally to describe the effects of detrimental anthropogenic causes. A proper concept of disruption should be distinct from perturbations or, in ecology, from generic disturbances. We illustrate this with examples from ecology, using the case of plant-pollinator networks, from organismal biology, with endocrine disruptors, and at the interface of psychological and cognitive development with digital media and young children. Specifically, we argue that understanding disruptions requires the articulation of historical and relational reasoning. The object of disruption, such as endocrine regulation or seasonal synchrony between plants and pollinators, is a specific property coming from history that is disturbed in a new, random way, leading to a loss or degradation of this specificity. Moreover, initially, this specificity plays a specific relational role, typically a functional one. This role is lost or impaired by the disruption, which explains the disorganization characteristic of disruptions. In our view, however, disruptions are a normal part of the evolutionary process. What is severely detrimental in the Anthropocene is the accumulation of disruptions at a pace that exceeds the ability of living entities to overcome them.
ENS, amphithéâtre Evariste Galois (45 rue d’Ulm, bâtiment NIR, 2e sous-sol)
To a large extent, the question of theoretical frameworks in the sciences has been neglected (or poorly treated) in philosophy. In parallel, we argue that scientists themselves are currently neglecting this question, and we will show the consequences of this situation in biology. We will then provide elements of the definition of scientific theories, which are partly grounded in the activity of theorization itself. We will articulate this discussion with the question of the function of theories and theorization in the sciences.
Biologists often use the term disruption more or less informally; however, this notion is increasingly used to describe the effects of detrimental anthropogenic causes. We argue that disruptions are distinct from perturbations or, in ecology, from generic disturbances. We illustrate this with examples from ecology using the case of plant-pollinator networks and organismal biology with endocrine disruptors. Specifically, we argue that understanding disruptions requires the articulation of historical and relational reasoning. The object of disruption, such as endocrine regulation or seasonal synchrony between plants and pollinators, is a specific property coming from history that is disturbed in a new way, leading to a loss or degradation of this specificity. Moreover, initially, this specificity plays a specific relational role, typically a functional one. This role is lost or impaired by the disruption which explains the disorganization characteristic of disruptions. In our view, however, disruptions are normal processes in evolution. What is severely detrimental is the current accumulation of disruptions at a pace that exceeds living entities' ability to overcome them.
During the first 25 years of the 21st century, we witnessed a resurgence of Organicism. This process is characterized by the return of the organism as a central biological entity and the increasing investigation on purpose and normativity at this level. Simultaneously, the issue of the vulnerabilities of living beings and their numerous disruptions is escalating in urgency. The need to comprehend these disruptions, and how living beings adapt to them, is pressing. Organicism, with its systemic approach to disruptions and its focus on organisms’ normativity, is the most suitable framework for this understanding. In this session, we will: 1) explore the epistemological role played by the morphogenetic field concept in the studies on the etiology of tumors in the early 20th century and its resurgence in the organicist conception of cancer as development gone awry (presented by Claudia Gadaleta, Paris 1 Sorbonne Panthéon - IHPST, Paris, France), 2) argue that a properly fleshed-out concept of disruption describes the effects of a significant category of detrimental anthropogenic causes in organisms and ecosystems. Understanding disruptions requires articulating historical and relational reasoning, which is a hallmark of recent theoretical developments (presented by Maël Montévil, Centre Cavaillès, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France) 3) argue that disruption causes a loss of function. The organismal agency may overcome disruption by acquiring novel functions, a process we call normalization. We will discuss two examples: i) how young quadrupeds that lost the function of their forelimbs teach themselves to walk as bipeds, and ii) cancer, a disease usually perceived as irreversible but known to regress spontaneously by normalization (presented by Ana Soto, Tufts University, USA and Centre Cavaillès, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France).
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